ABSTRACT Failure scenarios, which form the basis for accident scenarios, need to be studied to describe the failure behavior of complex systems. This paper proposes a hybrid intelligent method that combines the A * intelligent algorithm with the breadth-first search algorithm to automatically generate the failure scenario of a complex system with the failure scenario tree, while simultaneously calculating the occurrence probability of each failure path and of the whole system. The simulation is guided by the failure behavior rules generated based on expert knowledge. A case study of a power supply system with a warm standby subsystem is conducted. This system is also a multi-state system. The obtained results show that the proposed automatic reasoning can identify key failure scenarios that induce system failure, which can be helpful in the decision-making process.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the real world, many systems are comprised of a large number of components with stochastic and dynamic behaviors, e.g., the phased mission system, the multi-state system, the standby system, and the feedback system. Due to the characteristics of time-variant and structure redundancy, understanding the behavior of such a dynamic system and assessing its performance under undesirable conditions has become a challenging task [1] .
In risk analysis, it is generally assumed that failure events propagate through the system and the evolution routes may have many branches at specific nodes, resulting in different system failure modes with certain probability [2] . These are called accident scenarios. In the reliability area, these failure scenarios can be treated as failure routes of a complex system, and traditional reliability modeling is actually manually a failure scenario deduction process. Even a simple system may have hundreds of failure scenarios. For example, for a K-out-of-N system, after one subsystem or component failure, the remaining components will have different failure sequences, which results in many possible branches of evolution routes. For example, Chen et al. [3] studied
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Christopher Kitts. a K-out-of-N system with load sharing effect. In their case study, the failure sequence of a voltage-stabilizing system, consisting of a 2-out-of-3 subsystem and a 1-out-of-2 subsystem with six components will have more than 120 scenarios. It is a big task to construct the associated reliability model when the system complexity reaches such an extent. Furthermore, the manually construction process will introduce cognitive errors, which cause incorrectness of reasoning.
Many studies have been published that use automating modeling methods. Doguc et al. presented a methodology to automate the process of Bayesian Network construction by using the K2 algorithm. This is a commonly used rule mining algorithm, and the authors used it to automatically find the associations between the components [4] . The probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of complex systems, such as the Dynamic Event Tree (DET) method, also faces the difficulty that large number of scenarios will be generated, which is beyond human processing capacity. The accident scenarios can be automatically achieved with two types of methods: one uses guiding simulation and the other uses probabilistic clustering.
SimPRA is a type of guiding simulation framework that has been developed at the University of Maryland [5] - [7] . The engineering knowledge of the system is used as scenario exploration rule to guide the simulation of hybrid system behavior, which can generate accident event sequences and estimate the end state probabilities [8] . Although this hybrid system includes hardware, software, and human elements, different failure modes, dynamic features, and the physical characteristics of the system form the basis of the simulation model [9] . Nejad [10] extended the guided simulation method from the binary state to the multi-state and incorporated hierarchical planning and multi-level scheduling into the simulation [11] . The author provided a case study of a Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter satellite system. The presented results show that the automatic generation method generates more risk scenarios, most of which are difficult to identify by the FT/ET, especially dynamic scenarios at componentlevel events and the subsequent consequences for subsystem failure. Li et al. [12] developed a biasing scheme based on zero-variance importance sampling and SimPRA guided simulation for accelerating rare event simulations. Li et al. [13] also employed a depth-first systematic exploration strategy to cover all possible scenario branches at each branch point. These strategies increase the efficiency of the method.
A challenge for the dynamic approach of PSA is that it can produce abundant information, which requires considerable post-processing work to acquire the risk scenarios to be analyzed. Zio et al. proposed a possibilistic clustering approach to identify and classify the scenarios generated in DET analysis [14] - [16] . This method clusters the system trajectory generated by both the DDET and Monte Carlo methods according to the characteristic, such as sequence of events that occurred, end states, and evolutionary behavior of process variables designated by the analyzer. The effectiveness of this method is based on the scenarios generated by both the DDET and Monte Carlo methods. Podofillini et al. [16] applied this method to an accelerator driven system and the results showed that the dynamic characterization of the accident, including order, timing, and magnitude of the failure events in the sequence influence the system evolution toward either safe or failure end states, and this method needs the complete modeling of the system dynamic stochastic behavior. Mercurio et al. [15] considered the timing of events and the process evolution and identified and classified scenarios of the DET of a steam generator rupture event in a nuclear power plant. In their example, the DET are generated by the accident dynamic simulator (ADS) software which is the original source and research basis of SimPRA. Podofillini presents a possibilistic evolutionary fuzzy C-means (FCM) clustering algorithm and applied it to a batch reactor system [14] . Mandelli et al. [17] developed a Mean-Shift algorithm, which can identify most scenarios that have similar behaviors and classify them, and the authors applied this method to the reactor vessel auxiliary cooling system (RVACS) of a conceptual design for a sodium-cooled fast reactor.
Both methods in the dynamic risk scenario analysis area can be referred to when the failure scenario is studied; the VOLUME 7, 2019 latter is the basis of the former and only considers the failure of the system, without considering human elements. However, the dynamic characteristic of both timing and magnitude of the failure events in the sequence and the evolutionary behavior of process variables is identical to those of risk scenarios. Thus, the failure scenario generation of a complex system also faces the problem of a large number of scenarios generated for a single initiating failure event.
System failure behaviors are driven by the underlying failure mechanisms, which propagate from the bottom to the top and appear in difference failure modes of the whole system Correlations between the failure mechanisms can be treated as the evolution rule and guide the simulation to obtain failure scenarios of interest, without generating too much information to handle. Previously, we studied failure mechanism dependency for non-repairable binary system [18] , multi-state system [19] , PMS [20] , standby system [21] , and k-out-of-n system [3] . This study proposes a failure scenario generation method based on the guided simulation method, in which the dependency of failure mechanism are the guiding rules.
The contributions of this paper are as follows: Firstly, a failure scenario tree (FST) modeling method is presented based on the revision of EST and FT, which can model the failure mechanism evolution process with three dimensions of logic, time, and probability. Secondly, the failure mechanism propagation rule is extracted from expertise knowledge and form the guided rule sets, which are essential in the automation reasoning and simulation process. Thirdly, a hybrid method called B-A-MC, which combines with breadth-first search (BFS) algorithms, A * intelligent algorithm, and MC simulation is proposed to find the failure scenario of the complex system and evaluates the occurrence probability of each failure path.
Based on the above description, the following assumptions are required:
(1) The system components are non-repairable, i.e., none of the mechanisms, components, or products can recover from a failure or an unusable condition. (2) The system and its components are multi-state, while the failure mechanisms are binary. the system to directly enter the failed state from the current state, which means that there are no intermediate states. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the FST modeling method, which includes the component and system level modeling parts. Section 3 studies the failure mechanism propagation rules, which include the construction of a knowledge base and the reasoning engine. Section 4 introduces the hybrid method combined with BFS algorithms, A * intelligent algorithm, and MC simulation. Section 5 is a case study of an electronic power system. Finally, the conclusions of this paper and future planned studies are outlined in Section 6.
II. FAILURE SCENARIO TTEE
The failure or failure mechanism propagates from the bottom to the top of a system, thus, the failure scenario needs to be derived through level-by-level reasoning, which is also the process of system modeling. In the traditional modeling method, the event tree cannot describe the logical and timecorrelated relationship between failures or mechanisms; the fault tree provides a modeling method based on the failure mode logic relationship, however, there are still several defects in the analysis from the perspective of time dynamics, Petri nets have the advantage of dynamic modeling, but the expression of logic and time correlation are excessively complex.
A modeling method named ''Failure Scenario Tree (FST)'' has been proposed, which connects the occurrence of internal failures and external events into a tree in logical relationship and chronological order, and each branch of the FST reaches the final state of a system with a specific probability [22] . The FST can clearly describe the whole process of failure occurrence and development since it represents the system from the logic, time, and probability dimensions. The establishment process of the failure scenario tree is exactly the process of failure scenario reasoning. The automatic reasoning engine and automatic reasoning algorithm should be studied to avoid time-consuming modeling activity.
III. AUTOMATIC REASONING ENGINE
To deduce the failure scenario with automatic reasoning method, a core problem needs to be solved, i.e., how to let the program know when each branch reaches the final state and what types of final state it needs to reach. To solve this problem, the process of automatic simulation reasoning needs to be guided. In contrast to the SimPRA, failure behavior rules are used to guide the process, which are different from SimPRA, where these are guided by the entropy value. These failure behavior rules are based on the human's more comprehensive understanding of the system.
A. FAILURE BEHAVIOR RULES
All of the failure behavior rules originate from real products or can be deduced through expert knowledge. The rules are expressed in the form of an IF-THEN style, e.g., IF (condition 1) AND (condition 2) AND . . . , THEN (conclusion 1) AND (conclusion 2) AND . . .
The rules of failure behavior can be divided into two levels: the failure mechanism level and the component level. This is consistent with the hierarchical mode of the reasoning engine established later.
All failure behaviors rule is to use the FP -growth algorithm based on the Python language from a large number of FAILURE data found in a concentrated associated 34764 VOLUME 7, 2019 relationship, by building the FP tree all known data traversal twice, the first traversal support abandon all cell does not meet the support requirements of the connection between the item-sets; The rearranged and filtered data set is traversed a second time. By reading the conditional pattern basis of FP tree species, the frequent item-sets in the data was mined, and the correlation between faults was obtained according to the frequent item-sets
1) BEHAVIOR RULES OF THE FAILURE MECHANISM LEVEL
The rules of the failure mechanism level are mainly derived from five failure mechanism correlations, i.e., competition, trigger, promotion, inhibition, damage accumulation, and parameter combination mentioned before [18] . In the rule database, these five failure mechanism correlations are matched according to the effect of various mechanisms, and the correlation among them has also been identified. If a is competitive relationship matches, the form ''IF (mechanisms), THEN (mechanisms) AND (state = state + 1)'' was used to store it in the rule database. In addition, there may be other correlations in the failure mechanism, and they may contain a variety of conditions that need to be combined. For the case of ''there is a damage accumulation relationship between thermal fatigue (TF) and vibration fatigue (VF) acting on the interconnection solder of the same electronic product'', the following three rules will exist In general, interactions of three or more mechanisms are not considered. It is also necessary to add a rule that the state of the component remains identical regardless of whether the mechanism occurs: IF (-), THEN (-) AND (state = state) The character ''-'' represents a situation without mechanism.
2) BEHAVIOR RULES OF THE COMPONENT LEVEL
The rules at the component level are mainly functional logic relation rules of series, parallel, voting, and standby between units. The rules of the component level are used to determine the final state of the system, which corresponds to the state of different components under different logical relationships.
B. FAILURE BEHAVIOR FACTS
The failure behavior facts are a further important knowledge base in scenario generation, which include possible failure mechanisms, failure modes, and their correlation; furthermore, the relationships of the units or subsystems that constitute the product. These facts can be prerequisites for rule matching or new facts derived by rule reasoning, which are prerequisites for rule matching.
C. CONSTROCTION OF THE REASONING ENGINE
The reasoning engine can be established according to the forward reasoning and reverse reasoning mechanisms in the expert system [23] . The reasoning engine can also be divided into the failure mechanism level and the component level.
1) REASONING ENGINE OF THE FAILURE MECHANISM LEVEL
The reasoning engine at the failure mechanism level details how the internal mechanism of parts will develop to reach their final state. With the forward reasoning theory and the time order scenario tree, the establishment process of the failure mechanism level reasoning engine is as follows:
The following three mechanisms are assumed in the fact base of component: thermal fatigue (TF), vibration fatigue (VF), and hot carrier injection (HCI). Component A has three states of the function-state ''1'', the degradation-state ''2'', and the down-state ''3''. Because the failure process of component A can be divided into two phases: state ''1'' to state ''2'', state ''2'' to state ''3'', two rounds of rule matching are required in the process of reasoning. Before performing rule matching, a new fact such as ''-'' is added to A's fact base. When the first round of rule matching is performed, the initial state of the setting component is ''1'', the fact base as the current path, and the current state value of each path is calculated simultaneously. Since there is no path to jump out of the matching loop, the results are added to the fact base and the second round of rule matching is entered. This second round of matching still belongs to three rules and the obtained three results are added as trailing paths to the back of the three previously recorded paths; then, the state values of each path need to be calculated and recorded. After the above steps, the inference engine of component A can be obtained, which contains nine path information items as shown in TABLE 2. This information will be used as a new rule to guide the search algorithm to implement automatic scene inference.
2) REASONING ENGINE OF THE COMPONENT LEVEL
The reasoning engine of the component level is essentially the reasoning engine of the entire system. In contrast to the failure mechanism level, the branch information of the component level in the inference model is generally quite large and the reasoning engine cannot cover all branch information. Therefore, the component level uses a reverse inference mechanism to derive the minimum cut set for all preconditions when reaching the final state of the system. Due to the use of a reverse reasoning mechanism, the VOLUME 7, 2019 It is assumed that the system itself and the components A-E have three states of function-state ''1'', degradationstate ''2'', and down-state ''3''. The system's target state is set to ''1''. First, the premise path information is obtained as ''ABC-1, D-1, E-1'' by the concatenation rule recorded in the fact library, where ''D-1, E-1'' can be found in the fact base. Furthermore, ''ABC-1'' obtains three premise paths of ''A-1'', ''B-1'' and ''C-1'' by matching the parallel rules in the fact library, where ''A-1'', ''B-1'', and ''C-1'' replaces ''ABC-1'' in the previous path to obtain three new path information items. Since all information in the path can be found in the fact library, the match ends. All path information with system status ''1'' is: ''A-1, D-1, E-1'', ''B-1, D-1, E-1'', and ''C-1, D-1, E-1''. Similarly, all path information with a system state of ''3'' can be obtained. Since there are only three states in the system, none of the end states of the branches that satisfies the system state ''1'' and ''3'' premise paths are ''2''. Thus, the inference engine of the system of Figure 1 is obtained as follows:
The reasoning engine has only seven items of path information, while the inference model may contain up to 3 5 = 243 items of branch information. 
IV. REASONING ALGORITHM AT THE MECHANISM LEVEL
Firstly, the nodes and branch points are defined to avoid confusion. Taking the scenario order shown in FIG. 2 as example, the elements in each scenario tree and the final state information, such as A-1, A-2, and M 1 . . . M n are called nodes. The point that causes the scenario tree to appear as a new branch, such as point X, is called a branch point.
In this paper, the breadth-first search (BFS) [24] algorithm is used to perform ergodic reasoning of the mechanism layer failure scenarios. Taking a three-state component as example, the scenario of the mechanism level includes two levels of branches. To avoid repeated search, a search rule needs to be set, if the parent node is ''-'', then its child node can only be ''-''. This means that no mechanism occurs. Procedure 1 shows the failure scenario reasoning with BFS algorithm. And the automatic inference process of the failure mechanism level scenario of three-state component is shown in FIG. 2. 
A. REASONING ALGORITHM AT THE COMPONENT LEVEL
The A * algorithm is a heuristic algorithm for finding the shortest path in a directed graph network [25] . This study was inspired by the A * algorithm, where the optimal branch in a failure scenario tree can be can inferred extracted. The search for the optimal branch in the remaining scenario tree can be continued, and then extracted to continue the search, e.g., conduct loop iteration until the number of scenarios required by the analyst is reached. The extracted information is the Output:scenario listscenarios optimal branch in the remaining scenario tree, so that multiple lines instead of one optimal path can be obtained.
With regard to the above considerations, this paper has implemented the following improvements to the A * algorithm: 1) When the target node T is the current extended node, it is moved into the CLOSED table, and the solution is successful; however, the algorithm does not end here. The current optimal path is obtained by the parent node pointer in the CLOSED table, recorded, and then, the node T in the CLOSED table is deleted. At this time, if there are elements in the OPEN table, these continue to expand the minimum cost node. When the node T is reached, this step is repeated until the number of scenes is met or the OPEN table is empty, at which point, the algorithm ends. 2) If the current extension node is a child of the start node S, then, the CLOSED table is cleared, and the node S and the current extension node are added to the CLOSED table.
3) Each time a node is extended, the reasoning engine is accessed once. If the end state of the system can be directly derived at this time, its child node is no longer added to the OPEN table; however, the node T is added to the OPEN table, and its parent node pointer points to the current extended node. If the end state of the system cannot be obtained, but if there is a T in the child node of the current extended node, the system end state is determined to be ''2'', and the node T is added to the OPEN table. If the end state of the system cannot be derived and if there is no T in the child node of the current extended node, then, the node is expanded. 4) If the searched scenario is obtained by matching the reasoning engine to reach the target node T in advance, the scenario enters a pending state. At the same time, the scenario of the previous record is extracted, and the node in the scenario is replaced with other nodes at the same level without adding any new child nodes, and independent of whether the reasoning engine can reach the final state. The scenario that has reached the final state is extracted and set to the pending state. Comparing all current scenarios in a pending state, extracting the least costly scenario is the current optimal path.
FIG . 3 shows the flow chart of the automatic reasoning method. Details are explained in the case study section. Resistors R1 and R2 are used for circuit buffering. Thyristor V is used to receive the feedback signal control voltage. A bypass structure composed of D1, D2, D3, and C is used to lower the input high voltage to a stable ± 15 V DC voltage and output it to socket X. The detection switching device C will fail during the working period, and the reserve units D2 and D3 may also fail during the reserve period; however, the failure rate is lower than the working period and belongs to the temperature reserve. It has been assumed that the system and each component in the system have three working states: function-state (state 1), degradation-state (state 2), and down-state (state 3). In this case, there is at least one failure mechanism within the component. The mechanism can be of degeneration type or shock type.
V. AN ILLUSTRATIVE STEP-BY-STEP ESAMPLE
The failure mechanism inside the component can be obtained via historical data or experimental methods, or by the Failure Model Mechanism Effect Analysis (FMMEA) method. The life distribution type and typical parameter values of the failure mechanism can be obtained via historical data or Probabilistic Failure Physical (PPoF) methods. The failure mechanisms and distributions of each component in this case are shown in TABLE 3. TDDB represents timedependent dielectric breakdown; NBTI represents negative bias temperature instability; EM represents electrical migration; VF represents vibration fatigue; TF represents thermal fatigue; Crack represents an overstress type failure mechanism caused by shock trigger; EC represents the electrical contact. The correlation between the failure mechanisms will be determined by the mechanism level rule base. For components with three states, the failure process will be divided into two phases: the function-state to the degradation-state, and the degradation-state to the down-state. In the different states of the component, the distribution type of the failure mechanism remains unchanged, while the parameter values will change (TABLE 4) . Here, it should be noted that since Crack is an overstressed mechanism, the occurrence of failure will depend on the time at which the shock occurs, which is set to 6500 h.
B. FAILURE MECHANISM LEVEL SCENARIO REASONING 1) FAILURE MECHANISM RULES
The mechanism level rule mainly includes the behavior rules of each failure mechanism. These are based on the theory of failure physics and are widely found, for example The second rule indicates that if there are both ''Creep'' and ''EM'' failure mechanisms within the part, then Creep will accelerate the occurrence of EM. The third rule indicates that if there is a mechanism ''Crack'' inside the component and an external event ''Shock'' occurs, Shock will trigger the Crack, directly causing the component to enter the invalid state, and jumping out of the matching cycle of the rule.
2) FACT AT MECHANISM LEVEL
The mechanism level facts are mainly the internal failure mechanism and external events of the component; therefore, it is necessary to establish a corresponding fact base for each component, e.g.,
Shock'] We added the rule ''-'' to each fact bases to indicate that no mechanism has occurred. Since the ''Shock'' was set to occur at 6500 h, the external event ''Shock'' was added to the fact base of component V.
3) REASONING ENGINE
The mechanism level reasoning engine was established by using the forward reasoning principle. The component D 1 is used as example for the following description. Set the initial state to ''1'' to indicate that the part is working properly. The nine paths information generated is the inference engine of component D 1 , which is shown in TABLE 5. The three-state component requires two rounds of reasoning. During the first round of reasoning, the mechanism list is read and generates three new branches. The access inference engine finds that no branches can reach the final state, as shown in FIG. 5a ). Enter the second round of reasoning and read in the list of mechanisms. When the parent node is ''-'', only one branch is expanded according to the previously set search rule, and the child node is ''-''. The remaining parent nodes expand three new branches. All branches of the access inference engine reach the final state, and the state values of each branch component are extracted to form the final state event after each branch, as shown in FIG. 5b) . Consequently, all scene information of the component D 1 is obtained.
Based on the inferred scenario tree and the data in A similar step can be used to derive the failure scenario tree (FIG. 7) and state probability curve (FIG. 8) for the remaining components. The failure scenario tree of parts D 2 and D 3 is identical to that of D 1 ; however, the state probability curve is different from D 1 . In FIG. 7b) , ''S'' represents Shock. Scenario ''Shock, Crack, V-3'' indicates that the component is in the function-state before the Shock occurs, the Crack triggered by the Shock causes the component V to directly enter the down-state, and the skipped degradation state phase is indicated by a broken line. The scenario ''VF, Shock, Crack, V-3'' indicates that the component is in a degraded state due to the action of the VF before the Shock occurs. Then, the component fails because the Crack is triggered by the Shock. In the state probability map, the sum of the state probabilities of the components at any time is 1. In FIG. 8c) , the probability that the component V is subjected to the Shock at 6500 h, resulting in a failure state, is abruptly changed to 1, and the remaining state probability becomes zero. 
2) FACTS AT COMPONENT LEVEL
The system reliability block diagram in Section 5.1 is integrated into the fact database as shown in TABLE 6.
3) REASONING ENGINE
The component level reasoning engine is built using a reverse reasoning principle. Using the three-state system as example, first the matching target is set to the system: System-1 in entered into the fact base. By matching the series, parallel, and side-by-side rules in turn, under combination of components, the minimum cut set for all possible combinations of the state of each component when the system state is ''1'' can be achieved.
A similar step can also be used to derive the minimum cut set for all possible combinations of state of the components when the system is in a failed state, as follows:
Since there are only three states in the system, and since there are too many component state combinations in the degraded state, we set the other conditions that do not satisfy the states ''1'' and ''3'' to be the state ''2'', that is, State_2 = [others]. Combining State_1, State_2, and State_3, the reasoning engine of this case system is established.
4) AUTOMATIC SCENARIOS REASONING
According to the method of establishing the inference model, it is first necessary to determine the failure order of the component. Setting t = 4000 h, the analysis target is to infer several scenario information with the highest probability.
According to the curve of the state probability of the component as shown in FIGS. 7 and 9, it can be found that the probability that each component is in each state att = 4000 h is as shown in TABLE 7.
The order of the components ''X, D1, V, L, R1, R2, C, D2, D3'' is decremented according to the probability of the failure state as the component in the input order of t = 4000 h.
Since only few scenarios with the highest probability value need to be searched, it is not necessary to construct the entire failure mechanism tree. As shown in FIG. 9 , the network directed graph is used to represent the failure scenario of the system. The generation value of the starting node S and the target node T are both set to 1, and the remaining node generation values are determined as the probability of node occurrence.
The reasoning process of the scenario is completely autonomous by the program. The following presents the basic flow of the program to infer a maximum probability scenario using the improved A * algorithm. Continuing the search loop above can result in more sequences of scenes, and the probability is successively decremented. TABLE 8 shows the 15 scenarios with the highest probability of occurrence when t = 4000 h.
It can be seen from TABLE 7 that, when the running time is 4000 h, the sum of the probability of 15 failure scenarios, that are preferentially inferred, is 0.9835. However, at this point, there may be thousands of total scenarios that may exist, and the sum of the probability of occurrence of the remaining scenarios is only 0.0165. This ensures that the algorithm can obtain the probability that the system is in each state at the current moment after a finite cycle, thus reducing the time complexity of the algorithm. In addition, when the running time is 4000 h, the results of the 15 failure scenarios that are preferentially inferred are system failures, which indicates that the system has a probability of more than 98.35% at this moment. Moreover, the most likely cause of system failure is component X failure. Then, combined with the failure scene derived from the mechanism layer, corresponding compensation measures can be formulated.
The loop-off condition of the algorithm can be set not only as the number of scenes, but also as the sum of the scene's lowest probability value or scene probabilities. Suppose that we want to ensure that the inferred scene has more than 99% confidence to truly reflect the current system state; then, the cutoff condition can be set as the sum of the scene probabilities not less than 99%. When the running time is 4000 h, after 24 scenes are inferred, the sum of the scene probabilities reaches 0.9901. Compiling the algorithm in Python, the total time spent in inferring 24 scenes on a typical personal computer (Dell Inspiron 15-5547, i5-4210U CPU 2.40 GHz) was 11.7 sec.
The relationship between the number of scenes and the sum of scenario probabilities at t = 4000 h is shown in FIG. 10 .
A similar method can be used to infer the most likely scenarios of the system at other times, and to determine the probability that the system is in each state at the current VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 9. Failure scenario network directed graph.
FIGURE 10.
Relationship between the number of scenes and the probability. FIGURE 11. State probability map of the system. moment according to the probability and final state of each scene.
A Monte Carlo simulation based on random number generation can obtain the state probability map of the system more efficiently. Using the state probability data of each component obtained by the mechanism level inference, combined with the relationship between the system state and the component state determined by the component level reasoning engine, the Monte Carlo simulation method can be used to obtain that the image of probability that the system is in each state changes with time, as shown in FIG. 11.   FIG. 11 shows the curve obtained by using the scenario reasoning method to obtain the probability that the system is in a state of failure at 20 discrete time points (the cutoff condition is above 99% of the probability), and the error between the proposed method and the Monte Carlo simulation method remains within 4%. System failure probability can be efficiently calculated via Monte Carlo simulation efficiently; however, it cannot deduce the failure scenario, and thus, the main reason that affects the reliability of the system at each moment cannot be determined.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes a hybrid intelligent method that combined the A * intelligent algorithm with the algorithm to automatically generate the failure scenario of a complex system, which is guided by the failure behavior rules and facts at mechanism level and component level.
The failure behavior rules are generated based on expert knowledge, which includes failure mechanism level rules and component level rules. The failure behavior facts are an important knowledge base for generating the scenario. It includes failure mechanisms, failure modes, subsystems, and their relationships.
The complexity of large-scale systems is mainly reflected at the component level, because the number of components is large and the logical relationship is complex; therefore, the mechanism level failure scenario is limited. Thus, the BFS was used to deduce all scenario information at the mechanism level, while at the component level, an optimization algorithm of A * was used to prioritize scenario information to avoid branch explosion.
Firstly, a failure scenario tree (FST) modeling method is presented based on the revision of EST and FT, which can model the failure mechanism evolution process with three dimensions of logic, time, and probability. Secondly, the failure mechanism propagation rule is extracted from expertise knowledge and form the guided rule sets, which are essential in the automation reasoning and simulation process. Thirdly, a hybrid method called B-A-MC, which combines with breadth-first search (BFS) algorithms, A * intelligent algorithm, and MC simulation is proposed to find the failure scenario of the complex system and evaluates the occurrence probability of each failure path.
The advantages of this approach have been illustrated through a detailed analysis of an example multi-state power supply system with a series, parallel, and standby component. The obtained results show that the method can deduce a few most important scenarios with high occurrence probability. The proposed algorithm avoids to generate a large number of non-essential scenarios and then to cluster them. However, this method depends much more on the available knowledge.
The limitation of this method is that it takes a lot of time to build a rule base and a reasoning engine in the early stage. However, the rule base and the reasoning engine can be retained for a long time, so that after a long period of refinement and supplementation, the automatic reasoning of the system failure scenarios becomes faster and more accurate.
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